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Sentencing Reform in the States: Some
Sobering Lessons from the 1970's*
Franklin E. Zimring**
In 1970 the criminal law of sentencing was anything but a hot
topic in the Halls of Academe or in legislative assemblies. Major
emphasis within the criminal law was on codification and reform of
substantive principles.1 The prison population in the United States
was 130,000 less in 1970 than in 1980.' There was an acknowledged
need to make improvements in the way that judges and parole authorities make reasoned decisions. But major structural changes
were not anticipated.
When the Brown Commission (National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws) issued its final report in 1971, less
than a tenth of the working papers concerned criminal sentences
and some of that "sentencing" discussion concerned capital punishment.' The academic community was happy to live with the
Model Penal Code structure that had been crafted by Paul Tappan
and others. Legislators were satisfied with the status quo in the
allocation of sentencing authority except where notorious crimes
would lead to cries for "getting tough" through mandatory prison
terms.
Thus, the major assault on the old order of criminal sentencing was the substantive criminal law surprise of the 1970's. In
these pages I want to examine the recent history of the sentencing
reform movement in the states. State government is the main
arena of punishment policy in the federal system. Major changes
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* This is a revised text of the second Governor Thompson Lecture, delivered
at the Northern Illinois University College of Law in March, 1981. An expanded
version of this essay will appear as Chapter IV in REFORM AND PUNISHMENT:
ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING (M. Tonry & F. Zimring, eds.) (forthcoming).
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have occurred in the past decade and more change is on the way.
The question I will pose is whether we can learn from our past
experience. Part one provides a thumbnail sketch of recent
changes in the debate about sentencing. Part two briefly describes
the "determinate sentencing" systems that a number of jurisdictions have enacted as a response to attacks on parole discretion.
Part three will propose five lessons from the recent past that
would-be law reformers of the future will ignore at their peril.
PRISONERS, PROFESSORS AND POLITICIANS

By the end of the 1970's, a substantial number of American
states, including California, Illinois, Indiana and Maine, had radically restructured allocation of power in sentencing and every major state in the Union was considering major changes.4 Maine, one
of the first states to abolish parole, was considering its reintroduction.' Some influential proponents of "fixed" sentencing had reconsidered their position. The proposed Federal Criminal Code, a document that spent the entire decade under Congressional scrutiny,6
failed to be enacted in part because of disagreement between the
House and Senate about whether federal parole authority should
be displaced by a Federal Sentencing Commission that would create sentencing guidelines. When the proposed Federal Criminal
Code was submitted to Congress, nobody had ever heard of "sentencing commissions" or "sentencing guidelines." The pace of
change has been fast, indeed!
Where did it all start? For our purposes, the search is for
proximate causes. Problems of criminal sentencing antedate the
Code of Hammurabi, but our question is what happened in the
1970's. The key actors in my scenario are prisoners, professors and
politicians-in that chronological order. The precipitating events
were the prisoners' rights movement and the Attica prison riot or
uprising, depending on your politics. The climate was one of rights
consciousness as well as declining faith in the use of state power to
4. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, DEFINITE SENTENCING: AN EXAMINATION

OF PROPOSALS IN FOUR STATES (1976); F. HUSSEY, J. KRAMER & S.

LAGOY,

AN As-

SESSMENT OF THE CONCEPTUAL, HISTORICAL AND EMPIRICAL BASES OF DETERMINATE

SENTENCING IN AMERICA: TARGETING INDIANA AND CALIFORNIA (1977).
5. J. Coffee & M. Tonry, Hard Choices: A Primer on Critical Legal Tradeoffs
in the Implementation of Sentencing Guidelines (1982) (unpublished paper submitted to the National Academy of Sciences, Panel on Sentencing Reform).
6. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT (1971).
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coerce cures or to exercise total control.
Prisoners
The origins of the prisoners' rights movement are beyond the
scope of this undertaking.7 The impact of the "prison-eye view" of
sentencing is my focus.
Struggle for Justice,8 the first of the 1970's reform tracts,
spends much of the body of the report describing prison and jail
conditions. This is not done from the perspective of shocked
outside visitors. These are the inmates talking, quoted from the
text of a grievance petition:
We now address ourselves to the physical brutality perpetrated
by the officials of Tombs Prison against the inmates thereof. This
unnecessary brutality has been largely directed against the Black
and Puerto Rican inmate population. We vehemently denounce
this policy of inhumane treatment.
It is common practice for an inmate to be singled out by
some Correction Department employee because he did not hear
the officer call his name or because the officer did not like the way
this or that inmate looked or because of the manner in which the
inmate walked or because the officer brings the turmoil of his own
personal problems to work with him, and together with other officers, beat the defenseless inmate into unconsciousness, often injuring him for life physically and mentally or both.
IN CONCLUSION

We are firm in our resolve and we demand, as human beings,
the dignity and justice that is due to us by right of our birth. We
do not know how the present system of brutality and dehumanization and injustice has been allowed to be perpetuated in this
day of enlightment, but we are the living proof of its existence
and we cannot allow it to continue.
The manner in which we chose to express our grievance is
admittedly dramatic, but it is not as dramatic and shocking as
the conditions under which society has forced us to live. We are
indignant and so, too, should the people of society be indignant.
The taxpayer, who, just happens to be our mothers, fathers,
sisters, brothers, sons and daughters should be made aware of
how their tax dollars are being spent to deny their sons, brothers,
7. But see Jacobs, The Prisoners'Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960-

80, in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 429 (1980).
8. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971).
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fathers and uncles justice, equality and dignity.'

This document consumes seventy-five percent of the first six
pages of the report. It is no surprise, then, that the "prison-eye
view" of possible reforms plays a large role later in the report.
One thing that is surprising, in retrospect, is that Struggle for
Justice quotes with approval a document that was designed to rationalize a jail riot. Much of the liberal reform literature in the
early 1970's was inspired by a rethinking, precipitated by prison
violence, of the role of imprisonment. The classic case, the attention-getting cause celebre of this period, was Attica. The Attica
riot (or "uprising") galvanized elite attention on the prison as an
institution and ultimately led to an analysis of the purposes of
punishment and the institutions of punishment from the point of
view of those currently behind bars.
What was so special about Attica? That this riot should have
such stunning impact is, in my view, a function of three things:
(a) the moral climate of the late 1960's,
(b) the way the riot was handled, and
(c) the location of the prison.
The late 1960's was the era of rights consciousness and demonstrations, frequently not civil demonstrations, to vindicate those
rights. Beginning with marches for racial equality, demonstrations
and civil disorders became instruments of consciousness raising.
The prison riot, viewed in this light, seems legitimate. Moreover, if
one considers the prison riot a form of demonstration, the official
reaction seems bizarre. The "Kent State Massacre" involved four
deaths. The Attica uprising involved more than ten times as many.
One further contribution to the impact of Attica was the
prison's location. It was a New York prison, located in a state that
contained the media, opinion leaders and foundations which set
agendas, particularly liberal agendas, in this country. It was their
prison. One wonders whether a similar tragedy in New Mexico or
Texas would have set off such intense, elite soul-searching.
Professors
In the United States, most "elite soul-searching" is done by
university professors, syndicated columnists and think-tank types.
The usual vehicles are books written on foundation grants, Blue
Ribbon Commission reports to public agencies or ad hoc commit9. Id. at 2-6.
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tees. Attica, interacting with the mood of its time, produced all of
these in abundance.' 0 Furthermore, some of these post-Attica documents would play an important part in justifying proposed reforms in sentencing. Other voices, too, influenced the move toward
determinant sentencing. David Fogel, author of The Justice Model
for Corrections,was an ex-prison warden. Marvin Frankel, whose
critique led the liberal chorus criticizing the existing system, proposed different reforms that were not based on the prisoner's eye
view.' 2 The "professors" who served on committees and wrote
books brought ideological baggage of their own to the problems of
sentencing equity. Liberal professors have a passion for treating
like cases alike and a distaste for unregulated discretion. In order
to understand how these preferences shape the central, shared criticism of then current systems for determining criminal punishment, one must outline th*e huge and not tightly regulated discretions that even reform efforts left in criminal justice systems.
Under the Model Penal Code provisions, sentencing powers
are shared by prosecutors, judges, parole boards and the state legislature.' 8 The prosecutor chooses to bring charges and, if so, what
charges to bring. For example, assume there are charges for a Class
II felony and the defendant is convicted: Under the Code, who determines what kind of punishment and how much? The judge
chooses between probation and prison. The Code instructs him to
elect probation unless the defendant is dangerous, in need of rehabilitation or unless a non-prison sentence would "depreciate the
seriousness of the crime." If the judge chooses prison, he sentences
the offender to a minimum term of one, two or three years at his
discretion. The same judge has no power over the maximum term
the offender will serve and no power over how long, in fact, the
prisoner may serve beyond his minimum term. Assuming that the
judge in our example chooses one year, the offender will serve anywhere between one and ten years, depending on when the parole
board decides he is no longer dangerous or continued imprisonment will not hamper rehabilitation or depreciate the seriousness
10. See, e.g., T. WICKER, A TIME TO Dm (1975); H. BADILLO & M. HAYNES, A
No RIGHTS: ATTICA AND THE AMERICAN PRISON SYSTEM (1972); R. OSWALD,

BILL OF

ATTICA-MY STORY (1972); W. COONS, ATTICA DIARY (1972); NEW YORK STATE SPE-

CIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA (McKAY COMMISSION), OFFICIAL REPORT (1972).
11. D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS (1975).

12. M.

13.

FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER

MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Final Draft

No. 1, 1961).

(1973).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

of the offense. A convicted Class II offender can receive any sentence between probation and ten years imprisonment. Why is
that?
In the old California system, felons could receive anything between probation and life imprisonment for the same crimes. Persons convicted of similar crimes received grossly different punishments, and persons committed to prison arrived at the gates not
knowing whether they would stay for one year or for ten."' The
Model Penal Code, with its maximum sentence limits and a presumption of early parole release, cut down on parole discretion,
but left plenty of power with a centralized state correctional
agency. This the liberals thought a central evil of a punishment
system.15
One justification for these heavy doses of discretion was the
need to individualize sentences to achieve the rehabilitative purposes of the criminal law, to select only those who need treatment
for prison programs and then to hold them only until a cure has
been achieved.1 6 By the mid 1970's, faith in rehabilitation as a purpose of imprisonment was an idea whose time had gone.17
There was strong objection to the fairness of making a punishment decision turn on the need for treatment, whether or not
treatment worked. This, combined with evidence that in-prison
programs did not work, was a devastating critique of prisons in the
name of treatment. 8 There was also evidence in abundant supply
that the system's capacity to predict whether an individual would
commit future crimes was quite limited."9 The empirical evidence
for these propositions had been available for years. But I would
argue that the prison-based origin of the early 1970's review of the
purposes of punishment blew the cover of the "rehabilitative ideal"
more convincingly than a thousand empirical studies: How can
14. S. MESSINGER &
13-19 (1977).

GRESSION

15. See

P. JOHNSON, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR RE-

AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE,

supra note 8, at 83-144; A.
(1976).

VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS

16. Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: A Consumer's Guide to

Sentencing Reform, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1976, at 13.
17. Morris, Punishment, Desert & Rehabilitation,in EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER
LAW 139 (1977).
18. See N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME
CONTROL 110-44 (1970); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 1-57 (1974); G.
HAWKINS, THE PRISON: POLICY AND PRACTICE 45-46 (1976) and references therein.
19. See N. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 34-43, 62-73; J. MONAHAN, THE

CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR

(1981).
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anybody get cured in Attica, or Stateville, or San Quentin? How
can anyone in justice be sent to any one of these dungeons "for his
own good"? This context is important-throughout the 1970's we
retained faith in rehabilitation, possibly in some community settings for juveniles and the drug dependent, and for some nonincarcerative sentences. The slogan that "nothing works" is best
understood as "nothing works in the American mega-prisons."
In theory, the rejection of rehabilitation and the new 1970's
priority attached to equality in criminal sentences could apply, in
equal measure,. to judicial discretion and parole powers. Both the
judge and the parole board depend on rehabilitation as one excuse
for discretionary power.20 Both the judge and the parole board
could argue that discretion serves many other purposes, including
reducing the use and duration of imprisonment and treating offenders who are in fact different from each other as unique individuals rather than non-persons punished mechanically depending
on what section of the penal code was violated. Finally, both judicial and parole discretion could be justified as a means of reducing
disparity that results from different prosecutors pursuing different
policies, and parole could be viewed as a method of evening. out
disparities that result because judges sentence equally culpable defendants to widely different terms of imprisonment. 1
In fact, much of the liberal reform literature did propose cutting back on judicial as well as parole power." But the theory and
practice of parole were particularly vulnerable to assault, and this
special vulnerability became an important element of what was to
happen in the political process. Parole, more than judicial discretion, was linked to theories of rehabilitation and to the capacity of
administrative bodies to predict when offenders were no longer
dangerous. After all, the argument goes, the only thing that a judge
does not know when he passes sentences is how an offender will
fare in prison. If prison conduct does not predict later behavior,
there is no reason to second-guess the sentencing judge-no reason
unless you do not trust sentencing judges.
There is a further explanation of the special vulnerability of
parole authority to the mid-1970's attack-one that stems from the
20. See Zimring, supra note 16, at 14-15; M. FRANKEL, supra note 12, at 1-53,
69-102.
21. Zimring, supra note 16, at 16-17.
22. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 12; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE
ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING,

supra note 15.

FAIR

AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT

(1976); A.
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influence of prisoners and former prison officials in the debate.
Any prison inmate will rather naturally resent the system that resulted in his confinement and all the agencies that share, from his
perspective, the blame for his predicament. However, by the time
an inmate has served part of a prison term, his resentment will
tend to focus more upon the authorities that are keeping him in
prison than on the authorities that sent him to prison in the first
place. His immediate enemy is the parole board. His resentment is
particularly acute when, as was typically the case, hearings on parole release date occurred well into a prison term, creating uncertainty, dependency and a feeling of powerlessness. And for what?
To enable a hearing examiner to have more information about
whether his months or years at Stateville had yet produced a
"cure." That such procedures "turn our prisons into acting
schools" is understandable. That parole becomes the focus of inmate hostility under such circumstances seems inevitable.
The correctional official turned penal reformer also is more
concerned about parole authorities, because he sees their exercise
of power and is more remote from judges and prosecutors. Nowhere is the maxim that familiarity breeds contempt more true
than in sentencing reform.
David Fogel, author of The Justice Model for Corrections,is a
prime illustration. Experience in prison administration had confined his attention to the in-prison aspects of sentencing inequity
to the point where he advocated a scheme that would place tight
limits on prison time for a large number of offenders for whom
probation would remain a frequently used option.2" The convicted
offender could receive either probation or two years for the same
offense, but his cellmate, equally convicted, would have a similar
sentence. This may or may not be a decent proposal for evening
out sentencing disparity, but it is the essense of the "prison-eye
view" of criminal sentencing, in this case a prison warden-eye view.
Correctional administrators should begin the development of an
agenda for dramatic change. We need to take hold of the reins of
corrections' future and begin exerting the leadership we probably
possess. We need to spell out a practical and just program for
ourselves and with those over whom we are given legal sanction. 4
But what is problematic with a prison view of the entire system? I
cannot prove the matter, but allow some speculation.
23. D. FOGEL, supra note 11, at 179-271.

24. Id. at 281.

[1981:1]

SENTENCING REFORMS IN THE STATES

What is Wrong with the "Prison-Eye View"?
My thesis: for those who wish to protect the interests of all
convicted offenders, the characteristics, perspectives and prejudices of both prisoners currently serving time and former inmates must be carefully examined before their advice is unreflectedly accepted as the right path to reform. First, prisoners
and former prisoners are an unrepresentative sample of the population of convicted offenders in the United States. They are the
losers. The hundreds of thousands who have avoided prison after
felony conviction have less to detest about the institutions of criminal justice that processed them.28 If a penal system is producing
lenient results, this can only be known when a broader sample of
convicted offenders is studied.
The sampling problem is even more extreme when those currently in prison are consulted. At any given time, the population of
a prison will contain a larger proportion of those with longer than
average sentences than the population of convicted offenders sent
to prison.2 The offenders with shorter sentences will have left the
prison walls, and the sample of current prisoners will be the losers
among the losers.
Related to this is the point that every prisoner understandably
detests the system that sent him to prison. Having lost under the
current system, the offender behind bars is "reform-oriented". He
is willing to take risks that the convicted offender operating behind
a veil of ignorance about whether or not he will be sentenced to
prison might not be willing to take. This preference for risk is understandable, but one cannot simply assume the wretched condi'.
tion of the prisoner is justification for endorsing his risk preference. The Class X felon sentenced under a new determinate
sentencing scheme, such as that passed in Illinois, will detest that
system," and the felon denied early release because his "good
25. The disparity between rates of probation and rates of confinement has
often been noted. In 1976, for example, approximately 4,250,000 persons were
under state probation supervision (a rate of 583/100,000), while only 386,000 were
under confinement in state prisons and jails (a rate of 180/100,000). The ratio of
non-incarcerated convicted offenders to incarcerated offenders (for both felonies
and misdemeanors) was thus approximately 3.2 to 1. See U.S. DEPAR MRN oF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIS-

at 472, 491-92 (1981).
26. M. SHERMAN & G. HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA: CHOOSING THE
FUTURE (forthcoming).
27. Mid-70's authors such as Fogel made a point of linking prison discipliTICS-1980

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

time" has been revoked by a prison committee rather than by a
parole board will resent the prison committee system just as much
as the prior generation of felons resented the parole board.2
Unquestioning acceptance of the "prison-eye view" leads to a
peculiar form of endless change. Each generation of law reform
study groups will recommend change from whatever status quo to
something else. Recommendations for systemic change will become
endemic. Changes in the allocation of sentencing power and, with
them, wholesale re-examination of the purposes of punishment,
will come before the legislature every session. If this happens, competition between the interests of sentenced prisoners and other
convicted offenders might become simultaneously chronic and
acute.
This critique of prisoners as sentencing policymakers is limited and is not intended to deny the entitlement of current and
former prisoners to make major contributions on one crucial aspect
of penal policy: prison conditions.
Just as prisoners are a biased sample of consumers of the sentencing system, they are a proper sample for assessing conditions
within the prison walls. On issues relating to housing, crowding,
security, medical care and other aspects of life behind bars, prisoners and prison guards are a perfectly appropriate sample of consumers for a long-deferred consumer survey of the conditions of
confinement in American prisons and jails. Once the question
shifts from issues of who should go to prison and for how long to
the critical issues concerning the conditions of confinement, the
sample bias disappears.2 9
The convicted felon who is a non-prisoner has every right to
capture the liberal imagination on the issues of the allocation of
sentencing power. But those lucky enough to avoid the conditions
of American penal confinement should have little voice in comnary problems and low prisoner morale to the then current system of judicial discretion and parole power. Of particular concern was that a prisoner would find his
cellmate serving half as much time as he was for the same offense. D. FOGEL,
supra note 11. Under Class X he could be serving five times as much.
28. J. JACOBS, SENTENCING BY PRISON PERSONNEL (forthcoming).
29. The logical point is that only prisoners serve time in prisons. There are
others, of course, such as prison guards, the taxpaying public and potential victims of security lapses who have legitimate interests in prison conditions. How-

ever, putting security aside and assuming the question is how do we spend the
next dollar in improving prison conditions, the prisoner himself has a powerful
argument for consumer sovereignty.
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menting on those conditions. And this is despite the fine irony that
ameliorating the hardships of the American prison could increase
the chances that a greater proportion of potential prisoners will
become actual prisoners.3 0
Sorting through the distinctions and borderline cases between
penal policy generally and the conditions of correctional confinement is a difficult but necessary task for the liberal reformer.
These issues involve different constituencies and therefore different appropriate samples of consumers. And, quite possibly, it is
precisely the failure of the liberals to make these distinctions that
produced the political risks that make the 1970's a sobering reminder of how not to achieve effective sentencing reform.
So far, we have been dealing with the liberal intellectuals reexamining criminal sentencing in the wake of prison riots. Not all
intellectuals are liberals, however, and a series of influential books
on crime and punishment from a "law and order" perspective
emerged in 1975 and 1976. J.Q. Wilson's Thinking About Crime8'
and E. van den Haag's PunishingCriminals2 are representative of
the genre. The liberal titles, by contrast, emphasize "Doing Justice," and "A Justice Model" for corrections. The liberals emphasize equality while the conservatives emphasize crime control, but
there is apparent common ground on the issue of certainty of punishment. In some cases, liberals and conservatives seem to agree
that punishment means prison:
We can certainly reduce the arbitrary and socially irrational exercise of prosecutorial discretion over whom to charge and whom to
release, and we can most definitely stop pretending that judges
know, any better than the rest of us, how to provide "individualized justice." We can confine a larger proportion of the serious
and repeat offenders ....

3

This is Allan Dershowtiz, who probably voted for McGovern,
U.S.

30.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, I AMERICAN
PRISONS AND JAILS 91-148 (1980). Peter Greenwood has expressed a suspicion that

the relatively high quality of California Youth Authority facilities increases the
odds that young offenders will receive short sentences in such facilities rather
than probation. If the choice were reduced to Folsom or probation, one wonders
about the impact of short terms. See P. GREENWOOD, J. PETERSILIA & F. ZIMRING,
AGE, CRIME AND SANCTIONS: THE TRANSITION FROM JUVENILE TO ADULT COURT

39 (1980).

31. J.

WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME

32. E. VAN
33. J.

(1975).

DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS

WILSON,

supra note 31, at 208.

(1975).
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of the same vintage:
(1) presumptive sentences for first offenders should be set considerably lower than the prison sentences authorized today;
(2) a larger number of criminals who have committed serious offenses should serve time in confinement; and
(3) the area of discretion allocated to and exercised by sentencing
4
judges and parole boards should be considerably narrowed.
As we will see, this is an important area of common ground.
Politicians
Enter the politicians. The allocation of sentencing power is not
a "hot issue" in the average state legislature: law and order is. Efforts to abolish parole authority and achieve more equal criminal
sentences fell on nearly deaf ears in most major states. In California, the initiative for revolutionary changes came from a legislator
shopping around for issues.85 In Indiana, sentencing authority legislation was a product of a more comprehensive penal code reform. 6 In Illinois, a long-proposed restructuring of sentencing authority did not become a high visibility issue until the sentencing
provisions were amended by the addition of a "get tough" Class X
mandatory sentencing category.8 7 The marriage of law and order
agendas with a sentencing equity proposal should have been anticipated. Under these circumstances, parole-the enemy of the liberal
reformers-may have been a safeguard against increases in both
sentence length and sentencing disparity. But these speculations
are premature. Before making guesses about the impact of recent
reforms, we must examine the laws enacted during the middle and
late 1970's, a period we may come to call the "era of determinate
sentencing."
34. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 22, at 4. A substantial majority of
the offenses listed in the Task Force's illustrative set of presumptive sentences
call for terms of custodial confinement.
35. S.

MESSINGER & P. JOHNSON,

supra note 14.

36. Clear, Hewitt & Regoli, Discretion and the Determinate Sentence: Its
Distribution,Control and Effect on Time Served, 24 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 433
(1978).
37. Aspen, New Class X Sentencing Law: An Analysis, 66 ILL. B.J. 344
(1978); Aspen, Illinois' New Flat Sentencing Law, 4 CORaCTIONS MAGAZINE 72
(1978); State of Illinois, General Assembly, Analysis of P.A. 80-1099 (House Bill
1500) (1977).
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DETERMINATE SENTENCING-A BRIEF REVIEW

It may be useful first to describe a few of the 1970's state sentencing schemes and, second, to compare these schemes with the
objectives of the liberal reformers.
The best definition of determinate sentencing is a negative
one. It is a law that provides prison sentences that are not routinely reviewed or reduced by an agency that is called a parole
board or authority. How the power that was formerly held by parole authorities has been redistributed varies dramatically from
state to state.
1. In California, the judge retains "in-out" discretion for almost
all non-firearm crimes. If the judge chooses prison, he must compute the term from a very specific set of sentences provided by
legislation. The initial shift was of power from parole authority to
legislature, with the judge's discretion staying intact. Mandatory
sentence amendments, an annual event, are now reducing judicial
power.88
2. In Indiana, the total discretion of the system may have increased. In most cases the discretions that used to be shared by the
judges and parole board have all been shifted to the judge subject
3
to weak guidelines .

3. Illinois now operates under two separate systems, numbers and
letter. For the number felonies, the judge retains his "in-out" discretion. If prison is elected, the judge selects the prison term from
a relatively narrow band provided by the legislature. For Class X
offenses, the law removes the judge's discretion to provide probation-a minimum three years' time served (on the minimum six
year sentence with maximum good-time credit) is mandated by the
legislature. However, the individual judge has enormous power in
selecting Class X periods of confinement. The same felony that results in a three year sentence from judge A can result in a fifteen
year sentence from judge B. There is no parole review of either
sentence. The numbered felonies assume judges have the capacity
to individualize the decision between prison and its alternatives,
but restrict the judge's time setting discretion. The X system assumes that judges cannot make good "in-out" decisions, but have
the capacity to choose between doses of prison time that vary by a
38. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667.5, 1168, 1170, 1170.1, 1170.1a, 1170.1b, 2931,
3000, 12022, 12022.5, 12022.6, 12022.7 (West 1978).
39. See Clear, Hewitt & Regoli, supra note 36.
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factor of five.40
How should these legislative systems be judged by those who
wrote about "fair and certain" punishment and "doing justice"?
First, it is clear that abolition of parole has been achieved but that
the amount of discretionary power in the system remains high. The
only concrete advantage of the new systems is reduction of uncertainty about sentence length after the judge pronounces sentence.
This could have been accomplished by providing early time fixing
by parole boards.
Second, the only significant reductions in sentencing discretion have been mandatory minimum sentences, usually of considerable length. I do not think fifteen-year sentences for Class X felons
is what the liberal reformers had in mind. Yet forcing lawmakers
to make specific punishment decisions in advance tends to press
toward greater severity. This is not only because of "law and order" enthusiasm in our state capitals. It is also because the
lawmaker will typically have the "worst case" of a particular offense in mind when penciling in a maximum prison sentence. The
closer a minimum sentence must be to the maximum, the higher
the minimum sentence will float. Discretion is a necessary condition for penal leniency.
This is one reason why all the legislative responses to "just
deserts" sentencing have retained judicial discretion to choose between prison and probation for most offenses. To do otherwise
would result in one of two revolutionary developments. Either the
legislature would have to provide a list of felonies where prison
sentences would not be available for "worst case" offenders, or
everybody convicted of a felony would go to prison. The first alternative runs counter to the political climate of penal law reform.
Providing prison for everybody would double the flow into our
overcrowded prisons or shift even more sentencing power to the
prosecutors who determine and bargain for charges. The 1970's reformers who argued that larger flows into the prison system could
be counter-balanced by shorter sentences were innocent of the Xrated world in which we live; they were also probably dead wrong
about the proper role of imprisonment in the criminal law.
The retention of judicial "in-out" discretion makes it difficult
to judge whether any of the new laws has reduced sentence disparity. The sentences served by those imprisoned for the same crime
40. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-1, 1005-5-3, 1005-5-3.1, 1005-5-3.2,
1005-6-1, 1005-6-2, 1005-8-1, 1005-8-2, 33B-1, 1003-3-2.1, 1003-6-3 (1977).
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are equal in California. But why prison for them and not two other
defendants convicted of the same crime?
Earlier I suggested that the 1970's might come to be known as
the "era of determinate sentencing." Implicit in that prediction is
my belief that sentence reform that focuses only on time served by
those imprisoned is going out of fashion. More comprehensive
schemes of sentencing guidelines are now being proposed to supplant judicial discretion. This approach, adopted in Minnesota and
proposed in the Senate version of the new Federal Code, would
produce guidelines that regulate whether prison should be used as
well as determining prison terms.4 1 As the debate shifts to these
proposals, what can recent experience teach us about future sentencing reform?
SOME LESSONS

What sorts of problems should we anticipate in future reform
efforts? Let me nominate five candidates.
The Paradox of PartialReform
The old saw "half a loaf is better than none" may have no
application to partially successful efforts to restrict discretion in
setting prison terms. Shifting authority from parole authorities to
sentencing judges may have decentralized discretion in ways that
could increase sentencing disparities between counties and among
judges who sit in the same courthouses."2 Mandatory minimum
sentences are no cure. They shift discretion to plea bargaining
prosecutors. Further, unless the minimum sentence is very steep
indeed, the gap between minimum and maximum will remain
43
wide.
The Danger of Negative Coalition
In an area where change for its own sake often seems attractive, one early warning that things are not what they seem is a
collection of strange political bedfellows united in what I shall call
a negative coalition. In one important sense, the proponents of de41. For the Federal proposals, see S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); for
Minnesota, see Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary (1980).
42. Zimring, supra note 16.
43. This is the case particularly when criminal offenses are broadly defined.
See the discussion of Illinois burglary at text accompanying note 48 infra.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

terminate sentencing got exactly what they wanted, the abolition
of parole. That was the only goal they shared." When prisoners
and police chiefs united in proposing the abolition of parole, it
should be crystal clear that each group had a different vision of life
without parole. Civil liberties groups in particular seem susceptible
to participation in attacks against institutions before the likely
consequences have been considered. If the only principle behind a
proposal is negative, almost anything can be urged as a plausible
substitute. Many complain that determinate sentencing legislation
in Illinois was "used" by a law and order Governor. One of the
elements of the proposal that made it eminently "useable" is that
it contained no coherent affirmative principles about the use of
imprisonment.
The High Price of Equality
Having discovered that "half a loaf' assaults on individualized
sentencing discretion may not improve matters, the natural tendency of reformers is to go after the whole loaf: to create a series of
rules to replace discretion governing judges, prosecutors and police.
The usual goal is to assure by rule that "like cases" receive equal
treatment in the criminal justice system. In pursuit of equality,
there is a tendency to skip over deeper questions of sentencing equity, questions that go to the heart of the matter-who should go
to prison and why." Yet equal treatment of convicted offenders is
not fair treatment unless the deeper criteria of just punishment are
met.
At the legislative level, we have managed to debate an entire
generation of sentence reforms while finessing, to use a polite
word, fundamental questions of principle. We select prison
sentences in one of two ways. The most popular is statistical precedent. In California, the new prison terms were derived by taking
the median time served under the old system."' Thus, the dead
hand of the parole board ultimately prevailed-it was parole board
decisions about sentence length that governed time served under
the new legislation, at least until the legislature started amending
the fixed terms.
And what are the tools the legislators use to set new terms?
Emotion, intuition, pencil and paper. The 1976 legislation in Cali44. S.
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45. N. MORRIS, supra note 18; Morris, supra note 17.
46. S. MESSINGER & P. JOHNSON, supra note 14.
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fornia declared "the purpose of imprisonment" to be "punishment.'

7

If that's all we know, the most elaborate rules and tech-

niques for apportioning sentences are built on a foundation of thin
air. We cannot treat offenders equally without a coherent theory of
why we imprison. If we do not know what makes for "like cases," it
is pretty hard to assure that they are treated alike.
The Decline of Substantive Law
Fourth, I wish to suggest that we cannot fix precise sentences
without rewriting or ignoring modern penal law. The whole thrust
of the Model Penal Code was to unify and simplify substantive
offenses. Here is Illinois Burglary:
A person commits burglary when without authority he knowihgly enters or without authority remains within a building,
housetrailer, watercraft, aircraft, motor vehicle as defined in the
Illinois Vehicle Code, railroad car, or any part thereof, with intent
to commit therein a felony or theft. This offense shall not include
the offenses set out in Section 4-102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.' 8
What punishment fits that crime? None really. We either rewrite the offense into an elegantly graded series of crimes or we let
a commission subdivide the offense into units it thinks are appropriate. Or, we can preserve discretion, adapt meaningful appellate,
review of sentences and build toward a common jurisprudence of
criminal sentences. As of now, the administrative solution is more
popular than either legislative rewriting or judicially developed
common law. The link between criminal law and those factors that
determine punishment will, under these circumstances, remain
weak.
The Question of Prison Population
If there is power in numbers, prisoners will be a far more important influence in the next round of sentencing reform debates
than was the case ten years ago; there are more of them, almost
130,000 more, representing more than a fifty percent increase over
a decade. 9
It is difficult to objectively measure the capacity of a prison
system-how many inmates it can hold-or the degree of crowding
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 1976).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 19-1(a) (1977).
49. See note 2 supra.
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in a prison dormitory or cell. At the moment, however, such niceties are unnecessary to a policy discussion. Everybody agrees that
the prison systems in most major states are at or beyond capacity.
The disagreement concerns what we should do about the matter.
The alternatives are the creation of much more prison capacity or
rigid control on prison population.
This late in the hour, I hold no hope of deciding this debate,
but four preliminary observations may shed light on the coming
debates on criminal sentences.
First, how many prison cells we should build is a question of
criminal sentencing policy. It is a direct function of the number of
persons who should go to prison and how long they should stay.
Second, the removal of parole created a shift in the balance of
power between state and local government that makes prison population more difficult to control. Prosecutors and judges are local
officials. Without centralized state power over release, county officials decide prison policy and state government pays the bills. Executive clemency and "administrative" sentencing adjustments
provide some flexibility at the state level, but not much.
Third, there may be some value in viewing sentencing policy
as the rationing of prison as a scarce resource in accordance with
what the state sees as its most pressing problems. Two extra years
for robbery are two fewer for burglary. One reason why administrative bodies are more popular with reformers than are legislative
bodies is that this kind of opportunity-cost analysis is rare in the
annals of state legislation.
One final semi-irony concerns why prison populations have
grown. With all the new mandatory sentences, it is easy to imagine
that longer prison sentences are the explanation. Easy but wrong.
The number of people sent to prison accounts for most of the increase in most states. 0 Changes in the "in-out" discretion least
touched by the mid-70's reforms seem more important than all the
laws we have written. In an important sense, the main arena for
changes in punishment policy has been the local level, while all the
attention has been directed to the statehouse.
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